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Purpose	  –	  Our	  purpose	  is	  to	  encourage	  accounting	  regulators	  to	  address	  diversity	  in	  practice	  in	  the	  reporting	  of	  environmental	  liabilities.	  When	  Canada	  changed	  to	  IFRS	  in	  2011,	  Canadian	  regulators	  asked	   the	   IFRS	   Interpretations	   Committee	   to	   interpret	   whether	   the	   discount	   rate	   to	   value	  environmental	  liabilities	  should	  be	  a	  risk-­‐free	  one.	  Old	  Canadian	  GAAP	  and	  current	  US	  GAAP	  allow	  for	   a	   higher	   discount	   rate,	   resulting	   in	   commensurately	   lower	   environmental	   liabilities.	  International	  regulators	  refused	  to	  address	  this	  issue	  expecting	  no	  diversity	  in	  practice	  in	  Canada.	  	  
Design/methodology/approach	  –	  The	  focus	  is	  on	  a	  sample	  of	  Canadian	  oil	  and	  gas	  and	  mining	  firms.	  These	  domestic	  industries	  play	  a	  major	  role	  internationally	  and	  have	  significant	  environmental	  liabilities.	  The	  method	  is	  empirical	  archival,	  tracking	  firm	  characteristics	  and	  discount	  rate	  choice	  on	  transition	  to	  IFRS.	  
Findings	  –	  We	  show	  that	  there	  is	  significant	  diversity	  in	  practice.	  About	  one	  third	  of	  the	  sample	  firms	  choose	  a	  higher	  discount	  rate,	  avoiding	  a	  major	  increase	  in	  environmental	  liabilities	  on	  transition	  to	  IFRS.	  The	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  these	  firms	  had	  relatively	  larger	  environmental	  liabilities	  and	  that	  the	  discount	  rate	  decision	  is	  a	  strategic	  choice.	  
Research	  limitations/implications	  –	  The	  sample	  is	  based	  on	  one	  country	  and	  may	  only	  be	  reflecting	  local	  anomalies	  that	  have	  no	  broader	  implications.	  	  
Practical	  implications	  –	  Diversity	  in	  practice	  in	  accounting	  for	  environmental	  liabilities	  is	  not	  acceptable.	  Accounting	  regulators	  should	  act	  to	  create	  consistent	  and	  comparable	  reporting	  practice.	  	  
Social	  implications	  –	  Firms	  and	  managers	  facing	  larger	  environmental	  liabilities	  can	  choose	  to	  minimize	  environmental	  liabilities	  under	  IFRS,	  while	  it	  is	  the	  general	  public	  and	  society	  at	  large	  that	  bear	  the	  ultimate	  risk.	  
Originality/value	  –	  The	  paper	  pushes	  forward	  the	  debate	  on	  whether	  recognised	  environmental	  liabilities	  should	  reflect	  the	  interests	  of	  equity	  investors,	  or	  if	  other	  investors	  and	  stakeholders	  should	  be	  taken	  into	  account.	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ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITIES AND DIVERSITY IN PRACTICE UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REPORTING STANDARDS 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper we explore what is arguably the most material environmental item in 
relation to financial accounting: how de-commissioning costs, clean-up costs and other related 
environmental liabilities are recognised in the financial statements. Environmental liabilities are 
quite different from financial liabilities. In the case of default on financial liabilities, the creditors 
end up with the firm’s assets and the debt is effectively discharged. Environmental liabilities do 
not simply disappear if the polluting firm goes into insolvency. On the contrary, they often 
remain with the associated asset and serve to impair any future cash flows if the firm’s creditors 
take over. Environmental liabilities may lead the creditor to have no desire to take over the 
residual assets of the firm, if they loom too large on the balance sheet. Ultimately, and in any 
case, all the costs associated with pollution are born by society at some level. 
For firms in polluting industries, future de-commissioning and clean-up costs are often 
the largest unfunded liabilities recognised in the financial statements. The amount that enters the 
financial statements is the present-value of these liabilities and the liability duration is typically 
long, making them very sensitive to the discount rates used. This is an area of major divergence 
between generally accepted accounting principles in the United States (US GAAP) and 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Before moving to IFRS, Canadian GAAP 
was converged with US GAAP on the reporting of environmental liabilities. Under US GAAP’s 
Accounting Standards Codification 410: Asset Retirement and Environmental Obligations (ASC 
410), the discount rate is a credit-adjusted risk-free rate, based on the risk-free rate plus an 
upward adjustment to reflect the firm’s ‘own credit risk’. International Accounting Standard 37: 
Provisions, contingent liabilities and contingent assets (IAS 37) is most often interpreted as 
dictating the use of a risk-free discount rate, with no adjustments for own credit risk. The 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) staff, among others, implied that this 
interpretation of IAS 37 creates liabilities that are roughly double those that are recognised under 
US GAAP (IFRS Interpretations Committee, 2010, p. 14; Schneider, 2011a, p. 4). However, IAS 
37 does not explicitly state that including own credit risk is not allowed and it was argued that 
firms could choose to include own credit risk in the discounting of future environmental 
liabilities. The IFRS Interpretations Committee (IFRIC) was asked by the Canadian accounting 
regulator to take this issue onto its agenda. The IFRIC’s official response was that it did not 
expect diversity in practice and that there was no need to address it. 
The aim of the paper is twofold: first, we challenge the position of the IFRIC and we 
investigate whether there is diversity in practice associated with the move to IAS 37. Second, 
subject to finding such diversity, we explore its determinants, and in particular managers’ choice 
to continue including own credit risk in discounting environmental liabilities. Since the aim of 
the paper is explorative and applied in nature, we unfold our research aims as research questions. 
Our empirical analysis focuses on firms in the Canadian mining and oil and gas 
industries. We chose this setting for several reasons. First of all, because pre-IFRS Canadian 
GAAP converged with US GAAP on this topic, it is an ideal setting to explore what might occur 
if US GAAP and IFRS converge in accounting for environmental liabilities. Second, with the 
divergent opinions on how to handle the transition to IAS 37, the IFRS transition in Canada is 
appropriate to study firms’ different reporting incentives and the potential impact of diversity in 
practice on the reporting of environmental liabilities. As the Canadian IFRS transition date 
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approached, the oil and gas industry in particular promoted the idea that including own credit 
risk was allowed under IAS 37. The debate over including own credit risk became the major 
issue for practitioners and standards setters during the transition to IFRS in Canada. Canadian 
Regulators requested guidance from the IFRIC over the discount rate (Canadian Accounting 
Standards Board, 2010), but the IFRIC refused and the issue was left unresolved at the time of 
transition. IFRIC’s official position was that there would be no significant diversity in practice, 
Canadian firms would follow predominant practice and not include own credit risk (IFRS 
Interpretations Committee, 2011b, p. 4). Third, the Canadian mining and oil and gas industries 
play a major role internationally. Canadian capital markets have more publicly listed oil and gas 
companies than any other country; as of January 2012 approximately 35% of the world’s 
publicly traded oil and gas companies were listed on Canadian stock exchanges (Alberta 
Securities Commission). In 2012, 60% of all funds raised worldwide in the mining industry were 
raised on the Toronto Stock Exchange (The Mining Association of Canada). Any results, even if 
only attributable to the Canadian setting, have international implications because of the large role 
Canadian firms play in these sectors and the large environmental liabilities associated with them.  
Contrary to the IFRIC’s position, we provide evidence that significant diversity in 
practice does exist under IAS 37. Furthermore, we are able to identify some determinants for this 
diversity in practice: we find that the likelihood for firms to include own credit risk on transition 
to IFRS in Canada is increasing with the amount of environmental liabilities and when there is a 
greater exposure to U.S. investors, after controlling for size, bankruptcy risk, leverage, media 
coverage, volatility and auditor. Evidence that firms in the oil and gas industry are less likely to 
include own credit risk than firms in the mining industry is only marginally significant. 
However, we note that most of the largest Canadian oil and gas companies, with significant 
operations in the controversial Alberta oil sands, choose to include own credit risk in discounting 
their environmental liabilities, while most of their smaller counterparts moved to the risk-free 
discount rate.   
In additional analyses, we find no evidence that investors place different value-relevance 
on environmental liabilities based on firms using a risk-free versus credit-adjusted discount rate. 
This is an important additional element to understand why there is diversity in practice: if 
investors do not adjust for the discount rate choice under IAS 37, managers are not restricted by 
stock market forces in making their discount-rate choice.  We investigate this in two ways: we 
first explore the value relevance of reported environmental liabilities at the IFRS transition date 
and, second, we further investigate whether the choice of discount rate matters. Finally, we also 
make a brief inquiry into whether any diversity in practice exists for non-Canadian IFRS 
reporters, using a web-based sample of international firms.  
Our paper makes a contribution along three lines. First, to the best of our knowledge, 
there has been very little attention in environmental accounting literature paid to the dynamics 
around how environmental liabilities are actually estimated for the purposes of being disclosed 
on the balance sheet (Li and McConomy, 1999; Bewley, 2005). Most of the existing literature 
has focused on implicit environmental liabilities and voluntary disclosure. Off balance-sheet 
environmental liabilities have been shown to affect equity value (Barth and McNichols, 1994; 
Cormier and Magnan, 1997; Clarkson et al. 2004) and also bond pricing (Schneider, 2011b). The 
role of voluntary environmental disclosure has been hotly debated, over whether it provides 
meaningful information (e.g. Clarkson et al., 2008) or if it is just a legitimization tool (e.g. Cho 
et al., 2012). Our study is unique in that we are not trying to assess what firms may or may not be 
reporting, or their reporting quality. We study the actual managers’ decision on how to value 
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environmental liabilities in their mandatory financial reporting and present evidence on why they 
are making these decisions. The evidence we obtain allows us to provide valuable insights, 
which help inform the debate on the reporting of environmental liabilities and provide an 
incremental contribution to the existing literature.  
Second, the implications for standards setters and practice are significant. Our findings 
suggest that the issue of whether or not to include own credit risk for discounting future 
environmental liabilities under IFRS should be addressed. We provide evidence that firms do not 
behave uniformly and their choice is dependent on their own reporting incentives. Our evidence 
is aligned with the concerns of two of the big four auditing firms, who at the time of the on-going 
debate argued that own credit risk should not be allowed when discounting future environmental 
liabilities under IFRS, and that the IFRIC should clear up the potential for diversity in practice. 
In letters to the IFRIC, PWC stated: “we believe that the most appropriate approach is for credit 
risk to be excluded from the discount rate used to measure a provision” (PWC, 2010). KPMG 
stated: “We are concerned that the Committee’s stated intention that the Committee does not 
expect significant diversity in practice is unlikely to be realized” (KPMG, 2011). Despite their 
original position, both of these audit firms now accept either discount rate under IAS 37, on an 
international basis; a change brought about due to the IFRIC not addressing the issue and the 
ensuing diversity in practice in Canada.  
Third, from a broader perspective, our purpose is to push forward the debate on how 
environmental liabilities enter the balance sheet. Based on our evidence and arguments, we 
conclude with a normative statement that environmental liabilities are of a different nature from 
financial liabilities and that using own credit risk to lower on balance sheet environmental 
liabilities is not appropriate. We contend that there are aspects of environmental liabilities that, in 
many cases, make the inclusion of own credit risk inappropriate. The key point is that these are 
not normal financial liabilities. They are typically backed by some form of government-required 
security, do not simply go away in the event that the firm cannot meet its commitments and have 
implications for the residual assets of the debt-holders, future owners of the firm, governments 
and society. We also note that a further complication to the situation results from how 
environmental liabilities are re-valued each period under IFRS versus U.S. GAAP. Under U.S. 
GAAP (and old Canadian GAAP), once a discount rate is associated with a particular 
environmental liability, the discount rate cannot be changed over the life of the liability. As a 
firm’s credit rating declines (or increases), its new own credit risk adjusted discount rate only 
applies to discounting any new environmental liabilities that have arisen during the period. 
Under IFRS, all environmental liabilities are re-valued at each reporting period using the 
discount rate at the reporting date. This situation is fine if firms are using a risk-free discount 
rate. The risk-free rate is subject to less fluctuation, associated with macro-economic factors such 
as inflation (which is an appropriate factor to consider in discounting a future liability that is 
certain to occur), and it is decoupled from the credit risk of an individual firm. But current IFRS 
practice now allows own credit risk and if managers desire, environmental liabilities could 
decrease as a firm’s credit risk increases (this issue is covered in more detail in Appendix A). If 
standards setters choose to continue to allow own credit risk, the method of re-valuing 
environmental liabilities at each reporting date should not be a possibility and the standard 
should be changed to one that is converged with U.S. GAAP. We consider this a second best 
option, the first best is for the international standards setters to clear up the diversity in practice 
under IAS 37, and prohibit the inclusion of own credit risk. 
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 In the following section, we provide background information, informing readers about 
the discount rate debate and highlighting reasons for expecting diversity in practice. Section 3 
presents our research questions coming out of the debate described in Section 2. Section 4 
reviews our sample selection process and the design we use to address our research questions. In 
Section 5 we present the results, along with our additional analyses on value-relevance and 
international practice. Section 6 provides a discussion on how environmental liabilities might be 
appropriately reported in the financial statements and presents our concluding remarks. 
 
2. BACKGROUND 
With the move to IFRS in Canada, the larger Canadian oil and gas firms were expecting 
increases of hundreds of millions of dollars to their on balance sheet liabilities if they were to 
move to a risk-free discount rate for environmental provisions. The Canadian Association of 
Petroleum Producers (CAPP) identified this issue as ‘potentially the most material adjustment to 
the statement of financial position for the vast majority of CAPP’s members’ (CAPP comment 
letter to IFRIC, March 2011). Most of the largest firms in the sector, particularly those with large 
operations in the Alberta oil sands developments, took the position that they could include own 
credit risk in discounting these liabilities. The divergent positions on IAS 37 focus on the 
specific wording describing the appropriate discount rate under IFRS (IAS 37, para. 47): 
 
The discount rate (or rates) shall be a pre-tax rate (or rates) that reflect(s) current 
market assessments of the time value of money and the risks specific to the liability. The 
discount rate(s) shall not reflect risks for which future cash flow estimates have been 
adjusted. [Emphasis added]  
 
The key question is whether or not own credit risk is a risk specific to the entity and not a risk 
specific to the liability. The Canadian Accounting Standards Board sought to resolve this issue 
via a letter to the IFRS Interpretations Committee (IFRIC) in October of 2010 with the following 
question (Canadian Accounting Standards Board, 2010, p. 2): 
 
Issue – Can either the discount rate or the estimated future cash flows be adjusted for the 
entity’s credit risk when a provision is measured in accordance with IAS 37 Provisions, 
Contingent Liabilities, and Contingent Assets? 
  
In response to this request, IFRIC acknowledged that IAS 37 does not ‘explicitly state whether or 
not own credit risk should be included’. However, it took the position that predominant practice 
was to exclude own credit risk and that Canadian firms would follow predominant practice 
(IFRS Interpretations Committee, 2011b, p. 3). Based on this position, it did not take the topic 
onto its agenda, no authoritative guidance was given and the issue was left unresolved at the time 
of transition. Over the course of several IFRIC meetings, a number of board members and 
interested parties argued that, absent authoritative guidance, firms would do as they please. As 
previously noted herein, these parties included two of the big four audit firms (PWC and 
KPMG). The other two of the big four (Deloitte and Ernst and Young) argued that own credit 
risk was allowed (IFRS Interpretations Committee, 2011b). CAPP and several of the large 
mining and oil and gas firms, made submissions arguing that own credit risk was allowed and 
also provided examples of IFRS reporters in the oil and gas industry that include own credit risk 
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in their discount rate. The two audit firms with guidance against including own credit risk both 
changed their position after the IFRIC refused to give authoritative guidance.  
Part of the IFRIC’s reasoning in not addressing the ambiguity of IAS 37 was that it would 
be addressed shortly by the International Accounting Standards Board (IFRS Interpretations 
Committee, 2010). However, almost 5 years after the IFRIC decision, the issue still remains 
unresolved. The fact that diversity in practice is a concern for the industries we study is evident 
in much of the archival documentation reviewed for this paper. An example is the following 
excerpt from a comment letter by Teck Resources Limited, a large Canadian mining firm, 
submitted in November 2011 to the IASB, as part of the IASB’s agenda consultation (Teck 
Resources Limited, 2011, pp.1-2):  
 
…extractive activities are a global industry and there is disparity in the accounting for 
and presentation of various significant items, which makes comparison of similar entities 
difficult. …we urge the IASB to address the significant divergence issues in accounting 
for extractive activities.  
 
Despite various requests to provide guidance, this issue remains unresolved and managers have 
discretion to choose whether or not to include own credit risk. The next section will explore why, 
contrary to the IFRIC’s expectations, we expect to find diversity in practice given the lack of 
clear guidance on the transition to IAS 37.  
 
3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The extensive literature on earnings management has shown that when management 
discretion is available, it will be used (Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Roychowdhury, 2006; Dechow 
et al., 2010). Hilton and O’Brien (2009) provide evidence of opportunistic use of reporting 
regulations in the mining sector to avoid recognizing the impairment of mining assets. The 
opportunistic use of specific exemptions under IFRS 1 First time adoption of International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS 1), and other options that present themselves upon 
transition have also been documented in the recent literature. Capkun et al. (2012), Ahmed et al. 
(2012) and Cormier et al. (2009) present evidence of opportunism and earnings management on 
transition to IFRS for European companies. This evidence is in line with studies pointing to a 
limited role for accounting standards in determining reporting quality and highlighting the 
importance of firms’ reporting incentives (Ball, 2006; Burgstahler et al., 2006; Daske et al., 
2013). The application of accounting standards, including IFRS, involves judgment, the use of 
private information and thus management discretion. Many of the factors from this literature 
present themselves in our study.  
The IFRIC’s position that it expected Canadian firms to follow what it understood to be 
predominant practice is made quite explicit in a statement of the IFRIC Chair during the debate. 
The following is a direct transcription from the audio of the March 10-11 IFRIC meetings: 
 
I’m afraid the lesson for the Canadians is if you want a rules-based system you should 
have stayed with US GAAP. If you want to come to a principles-based system means 
making judgments, but considering the way that other people around the world also come 
to the determination of those judgments. And if you want a rule that says, or if you want a 
book of rules that says, I will do it this way unless you show me where it says I can’t, then 
I’m sorry, that’s the wrong philosophy for adopting IFRS. 
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With the lack of guidance on IAS 37, whether to include own credit risk or adopt a risk-free rate 
ultimately relies on managers’ reporting incentives. Our first research question focuses on this 
expectation and explores whether or not a significant portion of the sample firms acted to the 
contrary:  
 
RQ1: Is there significant diversity in discount rate choice with the move to IAS 37? 
 
Based on our expectation of finding diversity in practice, we are next interested in 
exploring what are the potential determinants of this diversity. A motivation to include own 
credit risk in discounting de-commissioning and clean-up liabilities is to minimize the balance 
sheet impact of a large liability. This could be desirable for two different reasons. On one hand, 
there might be some implications for financial constraints: if managers are concerned about a 
firm’s financial ratios (for example, it might be under severe financial distress), they might not 
want to bring the increased liability onto the balance sheet. On the other hand, managers might 
be concerned by a political visibility argument, in that a large amount of environmental liabilities 
may cause public pressure.   
Although minimizing on balance-sheet liabilities is something that could be desirable to a 
firm, there is also motivation for a firm to want to exclude own credit risk and move to a risk-free 
rate, driven by the desire to maximize future reported earnings. Garcia Osma and Pope (2011) 
explore the IFRS transition in the EU as a means of ‘cleaning up’ accumulated accruals bloat on 
the balance sheet. The more a firm ‘cleans up’, the more discretion it has in future periods to 
manage earnings. A similar opportunity exists with regards to choosing a lower discount rate on 
transition to IAS 37. Although choosing a lower discount rate is not ‘cleaning up’ accumulated 
accruals bloat, it has the same effect. A liability is being increased, some or all of which will be 
closed-out to retained earnings at transition due to the retrospective adoption dictated by IFRS 1. 
Appendix A describes in detail the difference between recognizing and expensing future de-
commissioning and clean-up costs based on using a credit-adjusted risk-free rate under US 
GAAP versus a risk-free rate under IFRS. Under US GAAP and old Canadian GAAP, these 
liabilities are called asset retirement obligations. Under IFRS, they are called environmental 
provisions. Hereinafter, we will use the terms environmental provisions or liabilities 
interchangeably. Based on the above considerations, we pose the following research question: 
 
RQ2a: Is the amount of environmental liabilities in the pre-IFRS period associated with the 
choice of the discount rate under IAS 37? 
 
An IFRS 1 exemption for IAS 37 is available to all IFRS first time adopters, dictating 
retrospective adoption, but it is a simplified process. This is described in the 2011 financial 
statements of B2Gold Corporation (p. 29), a Canadian gold mining firm, as follows:  
 
The Company elected to apply the exemption from full retrospective application of 
decommissioning provisions as allowed under IFRS 1. As such, the Company has re-
measured the provisions as at January 1, 2010 under IAS 37 “Provisions, contingent 
liabilities and contingent assets”; estimated the amount to be included in the cost of the 
related asset by discounting the liability to the date at which the liability first arose using 
best estimates of the historical risk-free interest rates; and recalculated the related 
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accumulated depreciation, depletion and amortization under IFRS up to the transition 
date. 
 
Thus, there is generally an entry to adjust the liability, offset by an entry to retained earnings and 
to the mining or oil and gas asset. Appendix B presents several examples of how this closeout 
was handled in practice. We also note that there is a specific IFRS 1 exemption dictating a 
modified method of retrospective adoption for the accounting for oil and gas companies using 
the ‘full cost’ method of capitalizing and expensing exploration and evaluation costs. Most 
Canadian oil and gas firms use the full cost method and the exemption available for these firms 
is a full closeout to retained earnings. A $1 million increase in the liability is offset by a $1 
million dollar decrease in retained earnings (less any tax effect). The following description from 
the 2011 annual report of Twin Butte Energy Limited (p. 26), a medium-sized oil and gas firm, 
concisely describes this: 
 
Companies using the full cost book value as deemed cost exemption are allowed to 
measure the liabilities for decommissioning, restoration and similar liabilities at the date 
of transition and recognize directly in deficit any difference between that amount and the 
carrying amount determined under Previous GAAP. 
 
There is tension between the positives of passing a portion of future expenses through to retained 
earnings (bypassing the income statement) and the negatives of a balance sheet effect. 
Furthermore, a number of Canadian firms in the oil & gas sector are active in Alberta’s oil sands 
and thus are heavily exposed to scrutiny for their environmental performance. Doubling the 
balance sheet amount of environmental liabilities may be something to avoid if possible. Given 
the full cost exemption allowing a complete bypassing of the income statement, available to all 
but a few of the Canadian oil and gas firms, versus the related increase in balance-sheet 
environmental liabilities, we pose the following question: 
 
RQ2b: Are oil and gas firms more or less likely than mining firms to move to the risk free rate 
under IAS 37? 
 
Another factor that might affect the choice of the discount rate is related to exposure to 
the U.S. market. Many firms in our sample have a significant U.S. shareholder base, as shown by 
the following excerpt from a CAPP comment letter to the IFRIC at the time (IFRS 
Interpretations Committee 2011b, p. 9), when the debate over own credit risk was on-going:  
 
Many of CAPP’s members have a significant US shareholder and financing base. In 
many cases, US shareholders account for 75 percent of equity investments and are the 
primary source of debt financing. US investors also make major contributions to the 
worldwide oil and gas industry. These companies require comparability with US peers in 
order to gain fair access to the capital markets. Since US GAAP requires that a credit-
adjusted discount rate be applied to abandonment and retirement obligations, these 
companies will not be comparable to US companies, as they will disclose a much higher 
liability for abandonment and remediation.  
 
The same sentiment was expressed to the IFRIC by Teck Industries, a large Canadian mining 
10	  	  
firm. If firms with larger exposure to U.S. investors wish to remain more closely aligned to US 
GAAP, then we would expect them to continue using an own credit risk adjustment. Therefore 
we pose the following research question: 
 
RQ2c: Are firms more exposed to the U.S. capital market more likely to use a credit-adjusted 
discount rate under IAS 37? 
 
In the next section, we discuss our empirical model that includes several control variables which 
may affect the choice of the discount rate, as well as our sample selection and data collection 
procedures. 
 
4. RESEARCH METHOD 
4.1 Empirical model  
In order to investigate RQ1, we follow the discount rate choices of the firms in our study 
and determine if a significant number continue to include own credit risk in their discount rate. 
We will also explore at the univariate level several company characteristics (i.e. firm-size, size of 
environmental provisions, etc.) to compare the firms based on discount rate choice, contingent on 
finding diversity in practice (RQ1). We then explore the firm attributes discussed in RQ2a-RQ2c 
that might be determinants of this choice. Wiedman and Wier (1999) explore firm choice in on- 
versus off-balance sheet financing while Beatty and Weber (2006) explore the decision to take a 
goodwill write-down. We rely on these papers for direction in our control variables, because they 
are also investigating a dichotomous decision based on management discretion (using a probit 
model). We employ the following multi-variate probit model: 
 
Own Credit Riski = β0 + β1Environmental Provisioni + β2Oil and Gasi +  
β3US Ownershipi + β4Sizei + β5Z-Scorei + β6Leveragei +  
β7Media Exposurei + β8Volatilityi + β9Auditori + εi  (1) 
 
Where i denotes firm and Own Credit Risk is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm 
continues to include own credit risk in discounting its environmental provisions upon transition 
to IAS 37, 0 if not (i.e. switches to the risk free rate). The coefficients of interest for investigating 
RQ2a-RQ2c are respectively β1, β2, and β3. Environmental Provision is on balance sheet 
environmental provisions scaled by market value at the close of 2010 and is meant to address the 
materiality of a move to a risk-free discount rate. If firms are motivated to minimize the balance 
sheet impact of environmental liabilities, we expect firms with relatively larger environmental 
provisions prior to the move to IAS 37 to continue to include own credit risk (β1 significant and 
positive). Oil and Gas is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is in the oil and gas sector, 0 
otherwise. If there is more incentive to bypass the income statement with the possibility to use 
the IFRS 1 exemption for oil and gas firms,	  we expect β2 to be significant and negative. If the 
reported balance sheet amount is of more concern to managers, we expect β2 to be significant 
and positive, so we make no directional prediction for RQ2b. Finally, given statements by firms 
in both industries in favour of minimizing the controversial liability and maintaining 
comparability with U.S. firms, we use US Ownership as a measure of relative exposure to U.S. 
investors. To calculate US Ownership, we obtain the total shares reported in the 13-F filings of 
U.S. institutional investors for the close of the third quarter of 2010 for each firm in our sample. 
A 13-F is a quarterly filing required of institutional investment managers with over $100 million 
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in qualifying assets. We use the 13-F for the close of the third quarter of 2010 because it would 
likely have been in the fourth quarter of 2010 when the discount rate was chosen. The total 13-F 
shares are scaled by the number of shares outstanding to give us an estimate of the percentage of 
total shares held by U.S. institutional investors. We expect that a firm with higher U.S. 
institutional ownership will be more likely to choose to report in a comparable fashion to U.S. 
firms (β3 significant and positive). Although we are not picking up exposure to individual U.S. 
investors, US Ownership is meant as a proxy for overall exposure to U.S. investors. 
We bring several control variables into the model based on the literature. Wiedman and 
Wier (1999) and Beatty and Weber (2006) both use the natural log of market value as a control 
for firms’ size. Larger firms not only will have larger environmental provisions, (and omitting a 
control for size might bias our coefficient of interest β1) but will also be more exposed to public 
scrutiny over the size of the environmental liabilities. We include this same variable (Size) as a 
control for size. Credit risk is another factor we wish to control for in our model. Since most of 
our sample firms are relatively small and do not have bank borrowing or bond issue liabilities, 
there is no credit rating data information available. Therefore, we adopt a modified version of the 
Altman Z-Score model (Altman 1968) to estimate expected credit risk for our sample firms (Z-
score).1 The Altman Z-score model is commonly used in the finance literature to estimate 
corporate default risk (e.g., Cavallo and Valenzuela 2007, Gonzalez-Aguado 2012). Following 
Beatty and Weber (2006) we also control for leverage (Leverage) measured as total debt over 
total assets. Regardless of the ownership structure, some firms might be more familiar to the 
public in the U.S. than others (for example, firms operating in Alberta’s oil sands). Thus, we 
include a control for relatively higher U.S. media exposure (Media Exposure), measured as the 
number of articles in 2010 mentioning each respective firm in U.S. major news and business 
articles scaled by each firm’s non-U.S. major news and business articles, as per the Factiva 
database. We control for firm risk similar to Beatty and Weber (2006) by including the standard 
deviation of the daily stock return for the year prior to IFRS adoption (Volatility). Finally, we 
have already discussed herein that two audit firms (PWC and KPMG) explicitly expressed to the 
IFRIC the opinion that own credit-risk was not appropriate under IAS 37. Auditors from these 
firms may be more reluctant to allow the inclusion of own credit risk. To address this, we use an 
indicator variable (Auditor) equal to 1 if the auditor is PWC or KPMG, 0 otherwise. Overall, we 
acknowledge that it is not possible to capture all possible motivations that may be driving 
manager choice. Indeed, some managers may simply believe that not including own credit risk is 
the proper interpretation of IAS 37, and this is difficult to model. However, in the context of our 
research questions, equation (1) presents a robust model and we now proceed to present our 
sample selection and data collection.  
 
4.2 Sample selection and data collection 
We collect as comprehensive a sample as possible of publicly traded oil and gas 
companies and metals mining companies listed in Canada that transferred to IFRS. Compustat 
and the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) cover a significant portion of publicly 
listed companies in Canada. However, they do not cover a large number of smaller Canadian 
companies. Another source of data for Canadian companies is the Report on Business (ROB) 
database, associated the Globe and Mail, a major Canadian newspaper. Wherever possible, we 
collect data from Compustat, CRSP and the ROB database. None of the detailed information on 
the discount rates and the related environmental liabilities is available and these data are hand 
collected from the notes to the financial statements. We select all oil and gas companies and all 
12	  	  
precious and non-precious metals mining companies listed on Canadian stock exchanges with a 
market capitalization greater than $50 million at the close of 2009, the year prior to the IFRS 
transition date (the $50 million cut-off was chosen because most smaller firms are early stage 
exploration companies and have minimal, if any, environmental provisions). This gives us a 
sample of 146 companies. Canadian companies have the option to report under U.S. GAAP, 
which includes some of the firms captured in our sample. These firms have no comparative IFRS 
data and are removed from the sample, bringing the sample size to 133 firms. We then also 
remove two firms that elected to switch to US GAAP rather than move to IFRS. At this stage we 
also find a number of firms that are cross-listed on other international exchanges that report 
based on the standards in those countries. We eliminate these firms from the sample, removing 
another nine firms.  
We are studying the effect that the move to IFRS has on environmental liabilities, so 
firms that have no material environmental liabilities to report are not meaningful in our sample. 
Removal of these firms brings the sample size down to 104 firms. Another five firms are pulled 
from the sample because they are either newly formed, have been acquired or recently merged. 
We also do not include three firms with fiscal year-ends after June 30, 2011, because the 2011 
financial statements were not available when the sample was established. Finally, we eliminate a 
mining company that simply expenses all environmental liabilities upon determining that they 
exist, ex-ante and ex-post IFRS, one firm that used the risk-free rate, ex-ante and ex-post IFRS, 
one firm cross-listed in South Africa that switches to the South African ‘risk-free’ rate, resulting 
in no change in the discount rate used, and two firms that are spin-offs of a parent company 
during the study period. The final sample for equation (1) consists of 87 firms that switched from 
reporting their environmental liabilities based on standards virtually identical to US GAAP to 
IFRS in 2011. This sample size compares favourably to other studies in the literature that take an 
industry-based approach, such as Cormier and Magnan (1997), Clarkson et al. (2004), Wier 
(2009) and Schneider (2011b).  
The hand-collected data was compiled by two of the authors and two research assistants. 
We employed a three-step procedure to ensure reliability of the hand collection. The first step 
was a pilot test conducted over a sub-sample (10 firms) of financial statements that were coded 
by the coders independently. As it is a straightforward hand collection of values and does not 
require much interpretation, few doubts were raised during this test. The consistency of the data 
collected was verified and we proceeded to hand-collect the data for the rest of the sample, 
which was split among the coders. The second step involved one of the authors (who also 
participated in the first step) double-checking for accuracy the key data collected on all IAS 37 
related variables (i.e. change in environmental provision, discount rate, etc.). Finally, all outliers 
of any kind were verified for accuracy. We believe that this three-step procedure for hand-
collecting our data has delivered reliable data. In all analyses, the variables are winsorized at the 
2.5 percent level giving us confidence that any results are not due to outliers, caused by coding 
errors or otherwise.  
 
5. RESULTS 
5.1 Diversity in Practice 
The first row of Table 1, Panel A, shows that of the 87 firms in our sample, 25 include 
own credit risk in their discount rate. 29 percent do not follow what the IFRIC declared as 
‘predominant practice’ (IFRS Interpretations Committee 2011a, p. 3). This leaves 62 firms that 
move to the risk-free rate, or 71 percent of the sample. We test whether or not this is significantly 
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different from 100 percent of the firms using the risk-free rate (RQ1). A t-test, with t-stat -5.88 
and p-value less than 0.01, strongly rejects a null hypothesis that assumes predominant practice 
is to exclude own credit risk. Qualitatively, with almost one in three of the firms including own 
credit risk, we conclude that there is significant diversity in practice. In Appendix C we present a 
number of the financial statement note disclosures of our sample firms. They are good examples 
of how different firms present directly contrary explanations of what the discount rate under IAS 
37 should be.  
In the second through fourth rows of Table 1, Panel A, we present value-weighted 
descriptive results based on market value, total assets, pre-IFRS environmental provisions and 
undiscounted pre-IFRS environmental provisions. By all of our measures, it is clearly the larger 
firms that are choosing to include own credit risk. The 25 firms that include own credit risk 
represent 70 percent of the market value, 73 percent of the total assets, 76 percent of pre-IFRS 
environmental provisions and 80 percent of the pre-IFRS undiscounted environmental provisions 
of the total sample of 87 firms. Table 1, Panel A presents the total dollar amounts associated with 
these variables as well. As an example of the magnitude of these amounts, the total undiscounted 
environmental liabilities for the 87 sample firms, at the close of fiscal 2010, are almost $51.5 
billion. This amount represents the firms’ own estimates of the future clean-up costs. The firms 
including own credit risk are responsible for $41 billion of these expected costs. The size 
measures presented in Table 1, Panel A show that value weighting in any way simply increases 
the strength of our inference. We conclude there is significant diversity in practice with regards 
to including own credit risk when establishing the book value of reported environmental 
provisions upon transition to IAS 37 in Canada.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
In Table 1, Panel B, we compare the means of market value, total assets and pre-IFRS 
environmental provisions for the firms that include own credit risk versus those that use a risk-
free rate. All of these size measures are significantly larger for the firms that include own credit 
risk in the discount rate. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
In Table 2 we present more details in relation to the size of the firms that do or do not 
include own credit risk. We base it on the market value of equity; however, the results we 
present are similar if the comparison is based on any of the other measures used in Table 1. 
Table 2, Panel A presents the number of firms including own credit risk that are in the top ten 
market value and then the number of firms including own credit risk for the remaining 77 firms. 
Of the top ten firms, eight include own credit risk in their discount rate (80 percent) and of the 
remaining 77, 17 include own credit risk (22 percent). In Panels B and C we present the same top 
ten breakdown as in Panel A, based on the oil and gas sub-sample and mining sub-samples 
respectively. In the oil and gas sector, seven of the top ten firms include own credit risk (70 
percent) while of the remaining 40 firms, only five include own credit risk (12.5 percent). The 
case is different for the mining industry, where four of the top ten firms include own credit risk 
(40 percent), while nine of the remaining 30 include own credit risk (30 percent). Qualitatively, 
the oil and gas sub-sample provides some insight into RQ2b addressing the oil and gas full cost 
exemption. All of the large firms that continue to include own credit risk are active in Alberta’s 
14	  	  
oil sands and have very large related environmental liabilities (and would be more concerned 
about public perception). Many of the smaller firms are more exploration based and would be 
less concerned about retrospective losses and the full closeout to retained earnings allowed under 
the full cost exemption (and more concerned about future earnings). We now move on to explore 
the results of equation (1), our multi-variate probit model, to fully address RQ2a-RQ2c. 
 
5.2 Multi-variate analysis 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the firm characteristics in equation (1), as well 
as information on the discount rates used pre- and post-IFRS. With the move to IFRS, the 
average discount rate went from 7.74 percent (Discount Rate pre-IFRS) to 4.47 percent 
(Discount Rate IFRS). However, for the firms that went to the risk-free discount rate, the average 
is 3.56 percent (Risk-free Discount Rate IFRS), for the firms that included own credit risk; the 
average is 6.71 percent (Own Credit Risk Discount Rate IFRS). This is a greater than three 
percent difference and considering it relates to the discounting of some of these firms’ largest 
liabilities, it is not an immaterial difference. Of note in our model variables is that environmental 
provisions (Environmental Provision) are equal to more than three percent of market value, on 
average, and over seven percent of the shares of our sample firms are owned by U.S. institutional 
investors (US Ownership). The medians are lower, showing skewness in these variables, but they 
are certainly material in magnitude. As is evident from Table 2, just over half of our sample is 
made up of oil and gas firms, while 41 percent of the sample firms are audited by either PWC or 
KPMG, the two firms that argued against including own credit risk.  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
In Table 4 we present correlations between the continuous variables in equation (1). 
There are several significant correlations that come out as expected. For example, larger firms 
have a higher Z-score, more U.S. ownership, lower volatility and are subject to more U.S. media 
attention (Spearman only). We do not present correlation tables for each industry, but a notable 
inter-industry difference is the correlation between size and U.S. ownership, which is much 
higher for the oil and gas industry. None of the correlations cause us great concern with regards 
to potential collinearity. The only correlation above 0.50 is the rank ordered Spearman 
correlation between Size and Z-score at 0.52. It is unavoidable to have a situation where larger 
firms rank higher in a credit risk score.  
 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 5 presents the results for equation (1) and our investigation of RQ2a-RQ2c. The 
inferred answer to RQ2a is yes, the size of pre-IFRS environmental liabilities affects the decision 
on discount rate choice; firms with relatively higher environmental provisions are more likely to 
include own credit risk. In order to understand the economic magnitude of this association, we 
compute (un-tabulated) the marginal effect of a one standard deviation increase in environmental 
provisions (as a percentage of market value), when all other variables are set at their means, we 
find that the likelihood of a firm to include own credit risk increases by 15 percent. This is 
compelling statistical evidence supporting our descriptive results in Table 1. Interpreting probit 
result is always a delicate issue and skewness in the data might affect the marginal effects at the 
15	  	  
means. Nonetheless, it is almost certain that our observation of firms with higher environmental 
liabilities making the choice to minimize the on balance-sheet liability is not random.  
 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
Moving on to RQ2b, the coefficient for the oil and gas industry indicator variable is 
negative at the 10 percent level. Thus, everything else equal, oil and gas firms are more likely to 
move to a risk-free rate, which maximizes the close out to retained earnings and the lowering of 
future environmental liability expenses. The marginal effect (un-tabulated) implies that oil and 
gas firms are 28 percent more likely to move to a risk-free discount rate than mining firms. We 
can only speculate that this might be driven by the full cost exemption available to the oil and 
gas industry, but it is a reasonable explanation. 
With respect to RQ2c, we show that a larger U.S. institutional ownership base is 
significant and positively associated with the likelihood to include own credit risk in the discount 
rate, suggesting that firms exposed to the U.S. market are likely to choose to remain more closely 
aligned to US GAAP. Considering this is precisely what the industry association (CAPP) told the 
accounting regulators these firms would want to do, the result is not surprising. The economic 
effect is once again significant: a one standard deviation increase in U.S. institutional ownership 
when ownership and all other variables are set at their means increases the likelihood of 
including own credit risk in the discount rate by 11 percent (un-tabulated). Finally, among the 
control variables, the coefficient for Size is – as expected - positive and significant, at the 10 
percent level. None of the other control variables are statistically different from zero. We note 
that although the audit firms PWC and KPMG argued that including own credit risk was not 
appropriate under IAS 37, whether or not they were a firm’s auditor (Auditor) had no effect on 
the discount rate choice. 
Our overall investigation of the possible determinants of the discount rate choice leads us 
to conclude that the size of a firm’s environmental provision and its exposure to the U.S. capital 
market are key determinants in managers choosing to continue to include own credit risk in 
discounting their environmental liabilities. Our specific research question on the oil and gas 
industry (RQ2b) supports our assertion that the full cost exemption available in this industry 
makes the move to a risk-free rate more desirable to the oil and gas industry. 
 
5.3 Additional Analyses2 
Robustness checks and sensitivity analyses 
Given the small sample size, we also replicate our probit analysis using approximate 
randomization (Noreen, 1989; Lundholm and Myers, 2002; Hammersley, Myers and 
Shakespeare, 2008). With approximate randomization, the dependent variable is randomly 
shuffled for all observations and then the regression model is run. We replicate this process 
9,999 times and compare the coefficient estimates obtained from the observed data with the 
distribution of coefficient estimates generated by the randomization process. The un-tabulated 
tests generated by the approximate randomization procedure are consistent with those derived 
from the probit model suggesting our inferences are robust. 
 We also run the main model separately for the oil and gas (n=47) and mining (n=40) 
sectors. We still find (un-tabulated) the relative amount of environmental liabilities significantly 
and positively associated with using a credit adjusted discount rate. This continues to support our 
concern over the use of the discount rate to minimize on balance sheet environmental provisions. 
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However, for oil and gas firms, U.S. ownership is not significant while size plays a major role. 
To further explore the overall role of firm size, we re-run equation (1) using total market value as 
a proxy for size, rather than the logarithmic transformation as in Wiedman and Wier (1999) and 
Beatty and Weber (2006). Again, results are consistent with the main analysis except that the 
coefficient for exposure to the U.S. market (US Ownership) is positive but not significant while 
size becomes significant at the 5 percent level. It is difficult to disentangle the effects of U.S. 
market exposure and firm size. As a firm grows, it attracts more attention from U.S. investors. 
Most likely, the result is due to the fact that the effect of exposure to the U.S. market is 
subsumed by the total market value of the company. Finally, to address concerns over 
multicollinearity among independent variables (Z-score and volatility have a correlation 
coefficient of about 0.5), we also run model (1) omitting one or the other variable or both and 
results do not change. 
 
Value-relevance  
The main purpose of this paper is to present evidence on the reporting practices under IAS 37 
and to discuss potential reporting standards problems as a result of these practices. However, the 
setting is one where an IFRS transition is covered and we would be remiss in not taking the 
opportunity to explore the move to IAS 37 from a market-based value-relevance perspective. We 
also wish to find if there is evidence of investors placing different value-relevance on 
environmental liabilities based on firms using a risk-free versus credit-adjusted discount rate. 
This is an important element to understand why there is diversity in practice: if investors do not 
adjust for the discount rate choice under IAS 37, managers are not restrained by stock market 
forces in making their discount-rate choice. We thus explore value relevance along two different 
lines. First, we are interested in understanding whether the move to IAS 37 increased value 
relevance for environmental liabilities. Second, given that we found diversity in practice under 
IAS 37, we are interested in investigating whether the market differentiates between the value-
relevance of environmental liabilities based on managers’ decision to include own credit-risk in 
the discount rate.  
To explore value relevance at IAS 37 adoption, we follow the method of Barth et al. 
(2014) where the 2005 EU transition to IFRS is covered using a model based on Ohlson (1995). 
When firms move to IFRS, reconciliation between previous domestic accounting standards and 
IFRS is required for the transition date, the full year after the transition date and the closing date 
of that year (the official transition date is one year prior to the first full year of IFRS reporting). 
From this information, comparisons between the domestic GAAP financial statements and the 
IFRS statements for the year prior to the first IFRS reporting year can be constructed. Barth et al. 
(2014) breakout shareholders’ equity and net income based on the accounting standards of each 
country pre-IFRS and the difference in shareholders’ equity and net income caused by the move 
to IFRS. They then go on to breakout the shareholders’ equity and net income differences based 
on the specific IFRSs driving these differences. We follow the same design, except that we only 
breakout the differences caused by IAS 37. Barth et al. (2014) use indicator variables for 
industry and country controls. We do not have to control for country effects and controlling for 
industry is done with a single indicator variable. The model is as follows:  
 
PRICEi = β0 + β1BVE_GAAPi + β2NI_GAAPi + β3BVE_Diffi + β4NI_Diffi  + 
  β5Closeout_IAS37i + β6NI_IAS37_Diffi + β7Oil and Gasi + εi  (2) 
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Where i denotes firm and PRICE is the share price at the close of the first quarter of 
2011. The right-hand side variables are for the year 2010 and are scaled by shares outstanding 
(Barth and Clinch, 2009). BVE_GAAP is book value of equity based on Canadian GAAP, 
NI_GAAP is net income based on Canadian GAAP; BVE_Diff is the change in shareholders’ 
equity due to transition to IFRS less Closeout_IAS37 less NI_IAS37_Diff. This removes the 
effect of our two IAS 37 change variables on the total change in shareholders’ equity due to 
IFRS transition. NI_Diff is the change in net income due to transition to IFRS less 
NI_IAS37_Diff. Closeout_IAS37 is the difference in shareholders’ equity as caused by IAS 37 at 
transition date. Under the full cost exemption available to oil and gas firms, this would be the 
entire difference between pre- and post-IFRS environmental provisions. For the other firms, part 
of the difference is added to property, plant and equipment, while the remainder is closed-out to 
shareholders’ equity. NI_IAS37_Diff is the change in accretion expense plus the change in 
depletion expense caused by the move to IAS 37. Oil and Gas is an oil and gas industry indicator 
variable as in equation (1). For brevity, we present only the results for the full sample, although 
results are similar on an industry basis.  
 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 6, Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for the variables in Equation (2). The 
closeout to retained earnings (Closeout_IAS37) was on average a decrease of nine cents per 
share. The difference in net income due to IAS 37 (NI_IAS37_Diff), on a per share basis, is 
minimal. The very small average effect on income for the transition year leads us to believe it is 
not material as an income item at transition and that any material effect will occur in subsequent 
years. The unreported correlations for the variables used in equation (2) show that share price 
(PRICE) is correlated in the expected positive manner with shareholders’ equity (BVE_GAAP) 
and net income (NI_GAAP) and negatively with the closeout to retained earnings 
(Closeout_IAS37). While the NI_IAS37_Diff variable shows no major correlations, likely driven 
by the fact that many of the observations are at or near zero, there is significant negative 
correlation between Closeout_IAS37 and book value of equity (BVE_GAAP). The correlations 
are not extreme enough to cause major concern, but in any case, before running our final price 
regressions we used diagnostics to determine that collinearity was not affecting our results.3 In 
Table 6, panel B the results of equation (2) are presented. The results show the expected signs 
and are significant at the less than one percent level for the domestic GAAP variables 
(BVE_GAAP and NI_GAAP). These are the key variables in the Ohlson model, and provide good 
explanatory power. The model has an adjusted R-squared of 0.72, but the only significant 
variables are shareholders’ equity (BVE_GAAP) and net income (NI_GAAP). The remaining 
variables are not significant. The equation (2) results imply that for the industries studied, there 
is no increased value-relevance with the move to IAS 37. These results are not terribly 
surprising, the application of IAS 37 shows significant diversity in practice and applying a 
coefficient to the effect of its changes is difficult. Two firms with a similar underlying liability 
may report a different change (or almost no change) in shareholders’ equity (Closeout_IAS37) 
and net income (NI _IAS37_Diff) upon transition, depending on its discount rate choice. Table 6, 
Panel B suggests that there is no additional value relevance of Environmental Provisions under 
IAS 37 as compared to Canadian GAAP. 
Our next objective is to find evidence on whether the discount rate decision is value 
relevant. This analysis is key to understand if managers are constrained by the market in their 
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discount rate choice. As in Barth et al. 2014 (p. 305), for equation (2) we do not make the 
assumption that investors have access to or use the disclosed reconciliations in the first 2011 
IFRS financial statements. Therefore, if we want to investigate any investor recognition of the 
discount rate decision, we must analyse data after the IFRS transition. The first three years of 
IFRS reporting in Canada are available to us (2011 - 2013). We hand collect these data in the 
same manner as described for the 2010 sample, following these companies in a three-year time-
series. Collecting three years of data gives us a more robust sample, although we do lose firms 
over the time-series due to mergers and acquisitions. A total of fourteen firms are part of a 
merger or takeover over the three years, four firms cease trading due to bankruptcy issues and 
one firm goes private. These firms are kept in the sample until the year they cease to trade, but 
results in this analysis are similar if we include only surviving firms. Our model is as follows: 
 
PRICEit = β0 + β1BVEit + β2NIit + β3EPit + β4 Own Credit Riskit +  
β5EPit* Own Credit Riskit + β6Oil and Gasi + εit  (3) 
 
Where i denotes firm and t denotes year. PRICE is the share price at the close of the first quarter 
of 2012 through 2014. The right-hand side variables are for the years 2011 through 2013 (as 
reported under IFRS), scaled by shares outstanding. BVE is book value of equity, plus 
environmental provisions, and NI is net income at fiscal year-end. EP is the total amount of 
environmental provisions. Own Credit Risk is an indicator variable as in equation (1), indicating 
if the firm used a credit-adjusted discount rate. Our variable of interest is the interaction term 
between EP and Own Credit Risk and the associated coefficient, β5. If investors recognize the 
reported amounts of environmental provisions and can also differentiate between firms that do 
and do not include own credit risk, we expect β5 to be significant and negative. Such a result 
would imply that the market picks up on the reported liability and can adjust for the firms that 
include own credit risk versus the risk-free rate in recognizing these liabilities on the balance 
sheet. We include the industry control, Oil and Gas as an oil and gas industry indicator variable 
as in equations (1) and (2). We control for year fixed effects and cluster by firm using Rogers 
standard errors. Descriptive statistics for equation (3) are presented in Table 7, Panel A and the 
results of Equation (3) are presented in Table 7, panel B. 
 
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
 
 As with Equation (2), we see the usual strong results for book value of equity (BVE) and 
net income (NI), except that in equation (3) they are based on IFRS. The oil and gas indicator 
variable is positive and significant, which is not the case in equation (2). Although this could be 
attributable to the change in the composition of the sample due to the mergers and bankruptcies, 
it is more likely due to the increase in oil prices that occur in this period. The coefficients β3, and 
β5 are not significant, indicating that neither the reported liability nor the different discount rates 
are relevant in the pricing model presented in equation (3). This implies that either equity 
investors do not consider environmental provisions to be material in firm valuation, or that the 
reported amounts are not accurate reflections of the underlying liabilities. Further research on the 
relation between firm value, environmental liabilities and how they are recognized in financial 
statements is warranted, but it is beyond the scope of this paper. For the purpose of our 
investigation, we cannot provide evidence that the market constrains the choice of the discount 




When the debate over the discount rate was on going, a number of examples of IFRS reporting 
non-Canadian firms including own credit risk under IAS 37 were referenced. The implication 
was that diversity in practice did exist internationally, and that including own credit risk in the 
discount rate was allowed under IFRS. In this additional analysis we explore whether diversity in 
practice exists under IAS 37 for IFRS reporters outside of our Canadian setting. To determine 
whether this is the case, we investigated the reporting practices of a sample of non-Canadian 
IFRS reporting firms. We focus on firms from polluting industries, including oil and gas, mining, 
chemicals and the energy sector. We select our sample by searching the Internet for industry lists 
in the oil and gas, mining and several other polluting industries. For example, for oil and gas 
firms we rely heavily on Platts top 250 Global Energy Company Rankings. From the firms that 
we can identify, we then examined the notes to their financial statements to determine whether 
they declare the discount rate used and whether it is based on a risk-free rate or is adjusted for 
own credit risk. A sample of twenty-one oil and gas firms, 20 mining firms, and 20 firms from 
other polluting industries (chemical, pulp and paper and electric utilities) is identified this way, 
for a total of 61 firms. The sample used is by no means the detailed industry ‘drill-down’ that we 
establish for the main sample of Canadian firms that we focus on herein. However, given the 
dominant position of the Canadian mining and oil and gas industries in company listings and the 
fact we cannot include US GAAP firms, such a ‘drill-down’ does not exist in many other 
settings. This web-based approach will bias our sample to larger firms with a stronger web 
presence. Regardless, it is a robust enough sample to explore practice under IAS 37 in a non-
Canadian IFRS setting, and will help us by highlighting whether there is diversity in practice 
outside our relatively narrow setting. 
 
INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 8 presents the results of our survey of IFRS reporting firms in the oil and gas, 
mining and other polluting industries (chemical, pulp and paper and energy utilities). Of the 61 
firms, we could identify nine firms that included own credit risk (15 percent). However, of these 
nine firms, seven were in the oil and gas sector. Of these seven, at least two (Eni SpA and 
Statoil) are larger than Canada’s largest oil and gas firm (Suncor) and are also active in Canada’s 
oil sands. One third of the 21 non-Canadian oil and gas firms in our sample are using own credit 
risk in their discount rate. We conclude that there are enough oil and gas firms including own 
credit risk that a Canadian oil and gas firm would be justified in pointing to international practice 
as a reason for including own credit risk. This is what the Canadian oil and gas industry did 
when presenting its arguments to the IFRIC and we believe this is a major reason we find 
significant diversity in practice in the oil and gas industry upon transition to IAS 37. The story is 
somewhat different for the mining industry. Of the 20 mining firms we sampled, we could 
identify none that included own credit risk. This puts the Canadian mining industry in a weaker 
position as compared to the oil and gas industry. However, if an audit firm allows an oil and gas 
firm to include own credit risk, the same audit firm would not be able to tell a mining company it 
could not do the same: in other words, once the practice is adopted by one industry, an auditor 
would not be able to deny its adoption by a firm in a similar industry. So we conclude that 
existing practice under IFRS was a driver in allowing Canadian oil and gas and mining firms to 
include own credit risk when discounting their environmental provisions under IAS 37.  
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6. Discussion, limitations and conclusions  
Before presenting some of our study’s limitations and our overall conclusions, we first 
enter into a discussion on what the appropriate discount rate for an environmental liability should 
be. Our study shows that there is diversity in practice, and therefore diversity in opinion, on how 
to discount environmental liabilities. A major objective of this study is to continue the discussion 
on this topic so that it will be addressed. Underlying the strict technical debate of whether own 
credit risk could be included in the discount rate under IAS 37 is the debate over whether it is 
theoretically appropriate and in the best public interest. We begin this discussion by presenting 
one of the most controversial comments that came out of the IFRIC discount rate debate, made 
by the IFRIC Chair, at the meetings of March 9-10, 2011: 
 
“… if I can make an observation at all about what I know of the extractive activity 
and also the Canadian situation. If you are about to adopt IFRS, I would encourage 
you to adopt it in the same way the rest of the world appears to have adopted it rather 
than continuing to use a Canadian GAAP type of approach and then finding perhaps 
in a year or two years’ time that you’ve got to change accounting for your provisions. 
But the key issue I think is the more I see one industry and particularly in one country 
but certainly one industry complaining, I have to question why they are complaining 
and what the change is. Many in the extractive industry for environmental reasons 
have to post a bond or a Government guarantee or some other assurance that they 
will be able to meet their environmental obligation when it falls due several years 
into the future. They do that because not to put too fine a point on it, people in the 
extractive industry, especially the smaller ones, exploit, pillage, rape and then 
disappear with all the money and leave the mess behind for other people to clean 
up.” 
 
It is our understanding that in general, neither the Canadian oil and gas industry, nor Canadian 
regulators appreciated these somewhat disparaging remarks. However, the IFRIC Chair does 
capture some of the key points that make environmental obligations different from a firm’s 
financial liabilities. As discussed in the Introduction, environmental liabilities do not just go 
away in the event that the firm cannot make good on its commitments. If shareholders manage to 
walk away from responsibilities associated with environmental liabilities they often fall to the 
creditors, and from there they fall to governments and society in general. Hence, environmental 
liabilities can be described as a liability that is not just attributable to the equity holders. Should 
accounting regulators believe that financial statements only reflect the liabilities directly 
attributable to equity holders, then including own credit risk is appropriate. However, then the 
full re-valuation of environmental provisions under IAS 37 at each reporting date (as described 
in Appendix A) is not appropriate and the standard should be changed to align with US GAAP 
on this point. With own credit risk allowed under IAS 37, if a firm approaches bankruptcy 
environmental provisions can be wiped off the balance sheet. We struggle to believe this was the 
actual intention of the IASB and the IFRIC. 
  Like all papers, ours is not without limitations. We acknowledge that we are dealing with 
a one-country sample, based on two industries and only one year of sample data. Thus, in many 
ways, we could only be addressing anomalies that have no broader implications, although we do 
provide evidence that diversity in practice is also common in the international sample. 
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Furthermore, with a small sample size, power becomes an issue with regards to finding statistical 
significance. However, we have a compelling setting in which to study this environmental 
accounting issue. The Canadian economy is by no means a small one and the two industries we 
study loom large both within the Canadian economy and internationally. They are highly 
integrated with the U.S. firms operating in the mining and oil and gas industries (particularly oil 
and gas) and also have a disproportionate share of environmental liabilities with regard to the 
overall world economy. Thus, generalizing our results and observations is reasonable, 
particularly given that we are comparing a form of accounting standards similar to US GAAP 
and the move to IFRS.  
The results of our study provide evidence that Canadian oil and gas and mining firms 
made discretionary choices when adopting the IFRS reporting requirements for environmental 
liabilities (IAS 37). Our key objective was to explore whether there is diversity in practice and 
we found that there is. In the lead-up to IFRS transition, a number of Canadian firms made it 
clear they felt including own credit risk was allowed under IAS 37, and we show they followed 
this up in practice. These firms include many of the large oil and gas companies operating in 
Alberta’s oil sands, have very large environmental provisions, and a large U.S. investor base. 
The overall results of our probit model in equation (1) imply there was opportunism when 
choosing the discount rate. Finding no value-relevance in the accounting information with the 
move to IAS 37, nor an ability by the market to differentiate between the discount rate used (as 
presented in equations (2) and (3)), is also consistent with diversity in practice and opportunistic 
behaviour. Based on the evidence, our main conclusion is that, until the discount rate issue is 
addressed, IAS 37 is not a quality standard; not because it leaves discretion to the management 
per se but because it does not take into account the nature of environmental liabilities and their 
recognition as a matter of public interest. The way in which environmental liabilities are 
accounted for is extremely material to extractive industries, and in a more general sense, to the 
investing community and to the public in general. It is difficult to determine what the principles 
are behind IAS 37 when it comes to ‘risks specific to the liability’. Ambiguity in a standard that 
allows a large liability to differ by upwards of 100 percent based on firm choice should be dealt 
with. Although principles-based accounting standards imply that the IFRIC does not take on the 
interpretation of every technical detail in accounting standards, the interpretation of IAS 37 was 
identified as a major issue when IFRS was being adopted in Canada. Of the 21 interpretations the 
IFRIC has issued to date, two have directly addressed issues related to extractive activities.4 
Canadian standards setters went to the IFRIC for guidance but no guidance was given based on 
the assumption that there would be no diversity in practice. Our results show that this is not true. 
In our IFRS transition setting we are looking at a standard that is very material to extractive 
industries and a country that is a major player in these industries. Our study cannot (nor does it 
aim to) provide evidence on whether the move to IFRS was good or bad, but it does provide 
detailed evidence on the move to IAS 37 and challenges a public interest issue that has not been 
addressed by the standards setters. Our study helps to keep the debate on this issue open and 
encourages readers to contemplate it. The ultimate goal is to get standards setters to make on 
balance sheet environmental liabilities directly reflect the true nature of these liabilities. No 
matter what one would wish, they do not simply go away if an entity is unwilling or unable to 




1. Altman (1968, 2003) explicitly mentions that it is important to include a market measure. 
In the original Altman Z-score model, market value is scaled by total liabilities. All other 
variables (working capital, retained earnings, EBIT and sales) are scaled by total assets. 
In our setting, many firms have very low levels of debt, so the sample cannot be scaled 
by total liabilities since the denominator is close to zero for these firms and the Z-score 
will be extremely distorted. Mining and oil and gas firms in their early stages often find it 
difficult to issue debt and there are incentives in the Canadian tax system encouraging 
equity investing. For example, a type of equity known as a flow-through share is 
available to investors in exploration phase mining and oil and gas firms. These firms may 
pass through losses and the costs of some capital expenditures through to the flow-
through shareholders, which may then be used to lower the individuals’ taxable income. 
Therefore, a significant portion of our sample has very low liabilities. So, scaling by total 
assets is our only viable option if we want to include a market measure in our Z-score 
calculation. To address this modification of the Altman Z-score model, we also include 
leverage in our model to be sure we capture direct exposure to creditors for those firms 
that do carry higher debt.  
2. For the sake of brevity, we do not tabulate all information relating to the additional 
analyses. However, they are available from the authors upon request. 
3. Our primary method of diagnostics was to explore the variance inflation factors and the 
ability of each independent variable to be explained by the other right-hand side 
variables.  
4. These are IFRIC 1 Changes in Decommissioning, Restoration and Similar Liabilities and 
IFRIC 20 Stripping Costs in the Production Phase of a Surface Mine.   
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Appendix A - Divergence between U.S. GAAP and IFRS, discount rate 
Readers of US GAAP financial statements will be used to seeing most on balance sheet 
environmental liabilities fall under the term Asset Retirement Obligations (AROs) as defined 
under Accounting Standard Codification 410, Asset Retirement and Environmental Obligations. 
Under IFRS, AROs are considered provisions and fall under the more general International 
Accounting Standard 37: Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets (IAS 37). 
Provisions will also include restructuring costs and possible legal settlements and are presented 
as a more aggregated number; however, they are required to be broken out in the notes to the 
financial statements such that it is evident what would be AROs under US GAAP. For extractive 
industries, provisions tend to be dominated by environmental provisions, with litigation 
provisions typically coming second. When an environmental liability (provision or ARO) is 
recognized as a liability, there is an offsetting entry to the associated asset (e.g., the mine or oil 
well). This asset is then written-off via depreciation or depletion. The other income statement 
expense is accretion expense, which is the discount rate multiplied by the opening value of the 
liability (conceptually, this is the change in the present-value of the liability with the passage of 
time). As the accretion expense passes through the income statement, the liability increases until 
it ultimately reaches the full undiscounted amount of the estimated liability. Figure 1 presents a 
comparison of the book value of an environmental liability based on a credit-adjusted discount 
rate and a risk-free one. The timeline until the expected clean up is 20 years. It presents a $1 
million estimated clean-up cost and a credit-adjusted risk-free rate of 8 percent versus a risk-free 
rate of 3 percent, assuming no change in estimate or discount rate over the 20-year timeline. 
Given that the ultimate destination of both liabilities is the $1 million estimated clean-up cost, 
the line in Figure 1 associated with the three percent risk-free rate is virtually flat while the one 
associated with the credit-adjusted risk-free rate of eight percent is quite concave.  
US GAAP requires that the original discount rate sticks with the original liability as time 
passes. Under IFRS the entire provision is re-valued each reporting period. For example, assume 
a $1 million liability was originally discounted at 6 percent and there are 10 years left in the 
timeline. Also assume the related firm’s credit standing changes due to a commodity crash and 
the firm changes to a 9 percent credit-adjusted rate. Under US GAAP, the 6 percent would still 
apply to the original $1 million and the on balance sheet amount would be $558,395 and 
continue to grow at the 6 percent rate for the next 10 years. Under IFRS, if the firm includes own 
credit risk, the provision would be re-valued to $422,411 based on the 9 percent discount rate. 
This provision would now grow at the 9 percent rate until the discount rate changes again. Thus, 
including own credit risk under IFRS can cause significant swings in the on balance sheet 
amount of environmental liabilities. Swings can occur using the risk-free rate, but they are much 
smaller and not related to the firm’s credit standing.  
The specifics of a transition to IFRS are dictated by IFRS 1. The general principle is that 
IFRS is prospectively adopted, whereby the financial statements are adjusted so that they are the 
same as if the firm had been using IFRS all along. In Figure 1, the point on the line where the 
switch to IFRS would occur is based on the number of years left until the clean up. Given the 
higher degree of concavity for the credit-adjusted rate, the more years left until the clean-up is to 
occur, the greater the relative difference between the on balance sheet liability recognized. Thus, 
a transition to a risk-free rate with 20 years left until the expected clean-up increases the liability 
by 146 percent (from $232,000 to $570,000), whereas a transition with 10 years left increases the 
liability by 61 percent (from $463,000 to $744,000). The other main effect on the financial 
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statements vis-à-vis the discount rate is the difference in the expense amounts that flow-through 
the income statement.  
 
Figure 1: Comparison of year-end environmental provisions (AROs), 20 years 
 
Notes: 
Figure 1 presents a comparison of on balance sheet year-end environmental provisions (AROs) 
over a twenty-year period assuming a $1 million estimated clean-up cost at the end of Year 
20 (assuming no change in estimate or discount rate over the 20-year timeline). The dashed 
line is associated with a three percent discount rate; the solid line is associated with an 
eight percent discount rate. What is evident is the greater concavity associated with the 
eight percent rate. If this liability were associated with an IFRS transition from an eight 
percent credit-adjusted risk-free rate to a three percent risk-free rate, IFRS 1 would dictate 
a move from the solid line to the dashed line based on the number of years left until the 
clean up is to occur. Thus, if the transition occurred with 10 years left until the clean up, the 
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Appendix B - Examples of the closeout of the change in environmental provisions 
At transition date, the change in the liability is offset by a mix of adjusting the book value 
of the asset causing the environmental damage, adjusting the accumulated depreciation (or more 
typically depletion) and adjusting retained earnings (or deficit). In the case of Teck Resources 
presented below, they continued to use a credit-adjusted risk-free rate, actually increasing the 
discount rate used at transition. Teck Resources Limited, 2011 Annual Report, p. 115: 
The adjustment on transition to IFRS measures the decommissioning and restoration 
provision (referred to as an Asset Retirement Obligation under Canadian GAAP) in 
accordance with IAS 37, Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets (“IAS 
37”). We applied the IFRS 1 exemption to not retrospectively apply IFRIC 1, Changes in 
Existing Decommissioning, Restoration and Similar Liabilities. This optional exemption 
allowed us to apply a short-cut method and record an adjustment for the opening 
depreciated cost of the decommissioning and restoration asset under IFRS on transition. 
Accordingly, we recorded an adjustment to increase the decommissioning and 
restoration provision asset by $65 million and an adjustment to reduce the 
decommissioning and restoration provision liability by $110 million for a total 
adjustment that increased equity by $175 million on transition to IFRS. As at December 
31, 2010, the adjustment to equity includes those noted above for decommissioning and 
restoration provisions and the adjustments described below in the comprehensive income 
reconciliation. 
 
In this case, the estimation under the short-cut method implies that under IFRS there would have 
been $65 million less in depletion expense (reflected in the decrease in the restoration provision 
asset) and $110 million less in accretion expense (reflected in the decrease in the liability). These 
cumulative expense differences are closed out to retained earnings at transition (reflected in the 
increase in shareholders’ equity). Another good example is Suncor Energy Inc., where a credit-
adjusted discount rate is also used, but the discount rate is slightly less for IFRS as opposed to 
the average discount rate used under Canadian GAAP at transition. The resulting difference in 
the environmental provision is $296 million. However, there is also an estimated cumulative 
increase in depletion expense of $690 million, for a total decrease to retained earnings of $986 
million.  
These are two examples of the IFRS 1 exemption short-cut method, and they have 
closeouts greater than the change in the liability. In most cases, the close out to retained earnings 
is less than the change in the liability. For example, Hudbay Minerals Inc. has an increase in 
liability at transition of $31 million, with an offsetting reduction in shareholders’ equity of $7 
million and an increase in the mining assets of $24 million. Finally, some firms do not change 
the discount rate at all, reflecting no changes at all with regards to environmental liabilities. 
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Appendix C – Panel A: Sample disclosures of conflicting IAS 37 interpretations 
 
Canadian Oil Sands 2011 Annual Report, p. 23 
 The asset retirement obligation liability and related property, plant and equipment were 
re-measured on transition at January 1, 2010, and, as applicable, at the end of each 
reporting period thereafter, to reflect the current risk-free interest rate. Prior to the 
transition to IFRS, these were measured using a credit-adjusted interest rate ... [emphasis 
added] 
 
Talisman Energy 2011 Annual Report, p. 44 
 
Under IFRS, the provision has been discounted using a weighted average credit adjusted 
risk-free rate of 6.7% at January 1, 2010 (Canadian GAAP – 6.6%) and 5.3% at 
December 31, 2010 (Canadian GAAP – 6.6%). [emphasis added] 
 
Suncor Corporation 2011 Annual Report, p. 98 
 
Under IFRS, estimated cash flows are discounted using the credit-adjusted risk-free rate 
that exists at the balance sheet date. [emphasis added] 
 
Twin Butte 2011 Annual Report p. 25. 
 
Twin Butte has selected to use the risk-free rate for discounting purposes as we believe 
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TABLE 1. Diversity in Practice 
 
Panel A: Full Sample of Mining and Oil and Gas Companies 
 
Move to risk-free rate Include own credit risk 
N = 87 
 
   
Number of firms 62 71% 25 29% 
Total market value $140,294,885 30% $327,367,873 70% 
Total assets $109,985,030 27% $299,041,718 73% 
Total environmental provisions $    3,540,957 24% $  11,277,103 76% 
Undiscounted clean-up costs $ 10,424,409 20% $41,086,367 80% 
H0: Mean of risk-free indicator = 1; t-stat = -5.88, p-value < 0.01 
 
Panel B: Comparison of means; full sample of mining and oil and gas companies 
N = 87 Move to risk-free rate Sig. Include own credit risk 
Means 62 firms 
 
25 firms 
Total market value $2,262,820 *** $13,094,714  
Total assets $1,773,952  *** $11,961,668  
Total environmental provisions $     55,805 ** $    438,921  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Notes: 
Amounts are in $CDN ’000s. At December 31, 2010 $1 CDN = $0.9946 U.S.  
For Panels A through D: market value is first-quarter-end market value after release of year-end financials 
of the last pre-IFRS reporting year. Total assets are for the close of the last pre-IFRS reporting year. 
Environmental provisions are as per pre-IFRS GAAP. Significance levels are one-tailed with the 
expectation that the values will be higher for firms that do not move to the risk-free rate.  
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TABLE 2. Firms including own credit risk in discount rate by market value 
 
Panel A: Total Sample 
N = 87 Number of firms Percent 
Firms including own credit risk 25 29% 
Firms in top 10 market value including own credit risk 8 80% 
Firms in bottom 77 market value including own credit risk 17 22% 
 
Panel B: Oil and Gas Firms 
  N = 47 Number of firms Percent 
Firms including own credit risk 12 26% 
Firms in top 10 market value including own credit risk 7 70% 
Firms in bottom 37 market value including own credit risk 5 14% 
 
Panel C: Mining Firms 
  N = 40 Number of firms Percent 
Firms including own credit risk 13 33% 
Firms in top 10 market value including own credit risk 4 40% 
Firms in bottom 30 market value using Risk-free Rate 9 30% 
 
Notes: 






TABLE 3. Descriptive Statistics 
     
Variable N Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Discount Rate pre-IFRS 87 7.74% 8.00% 1.91% 
Discount Rate IFRS 87 4.47% 3.74% 1.95% 
Risk-free Discount Rate IFRS  62 3.56% 3.50% 1.12% 
Own Credit Risk Discount Rate IFRS 25 6.71% 6.80% 1.99% 
Environmental Provision  87 3.06% 1.66% 3.14% 
Oil and Gas 87 54.02% N/A N/A 
US Ownership 87 7.04% 0.40% 12.66% 
Size 87 14.07 13.92 1.64 
Z-Score 87 1.25 1.20 1.31 
Leverage 87 31.98% 31.65% 15.61% 
Media Coverage 87 17.23% 13.93% 14.43% 
Volatility 87 2.82% 2.84% 0.89% 




Discount Rate pre-IFRS and Discount Rate IFRS are the average discount rates used by sample firms to 
discount their environmental provisions respectively before and after IFRS adoption.  
Risk-free Discount Rate IFRS and Own Credit Risk Discount Rate IFRS are the average discount rates 
for firms using the risk-free rate and own credit risk respectively. 
Environmental Provision is total environmental provisions scaled by market value. 
Oil and Gas is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is in the oil and gas sector, 0 if it is in the 
mining sector. 
US Ownership is the number of shares reported in the 13-Fs of U.S. institutional investors scaled by 
shares outstanding at the end of quarter 3, 2010.  
Size is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity, measured in $CDN billions, at the end of the 
fiscal year prior to IFRS transition (typically December 31, 2010).  
Z-Score is the modified Altman Z-score as described herein. 
Leverage is total liabilities, less environmental provisions, scaled by total assets. 
Media Coverage is the number of U.S. media stories naming each firm, scaled by all non-U.S. media 
stories naming each firm. 
Volatility is the standard deviation of the daily stock return for the year prior to IFRS adoption. 
Auditor is an indicator equal to 1 if the firm’s auditor is KPMG or PWC, 0 otherwise. 
All continuous variables (except for the discount rates) are winsorized at 2.5 percent.  
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TABLE 4. Correlation matrix for continuous variables in equation (1) probit model 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Environmental Provision 
 
0.04 -0.20* -0.46*** 0.32*** 0.03 -0.27** 
2 US ownership 0.07 
 
0.46*** 0.19* 0.1 0.19* -0.19* 
3 Size -0.15 0.40*** 
 
0.52*** 0.15 0.25** -0.46*** 
4 Z-score -0.46*** -0.01 0.41*** 
 
-0.25** 0.02 -0.03 
5 Leverage 0.30*** 0.14 0.13 -0.37*** 
 
0.03 -0.14 
6 Media Coverage <0.01 -0.01 0.14 <0.01 -0.01 
 
-0.20* 
7 Volatility -0.17 -0.08 -0.49*** -0.05 -0.02 -0.13 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Notes: 
Pearson (Spearman) correlations are reported below (above) diagonal. 
All variables are defined in the notes to Table 3.  
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TABLE 5. Results for equation (1) probit model 
 
 Expected Sign Coefficient 
   
Environmental Provision + 15.01** 
  (2.28) 
Oil and Gas  +/- -0.90* 
  (-1.66) 
US Ownership + 2.78** 
  (2.06) 
Size + 0.20* 
  (1.31) 
Z-Score - 0.045 
 
 (0.25) 
Leverage + -1.48 
  (-1.02) 
Media Coverage + -0.28 
  (-0.23) 
Volatility + -27.54 
  (-0.90) 
Audit - -0.35 
  (-1.00) 
Constant  -2.34 
  (-0.94) 
 
  Observations  87 
Pseudo R2  0.21 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, z-stats in parentheses. 
 
Notes: 
This table presents the probit regression results based on equation (1). 
Variable definitions: 
The dependent variable, Own Credit Risk, is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm includes own 
credit risk in its discount rate for environmental provisions, 0 otherwise. All other variables are defined in 
the notes to Table 3.  
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TABLE 6.  
 
Panel A - Sample Descriptive Statistics for equation (2) 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. 
PRICE 16.27 9.06 16.76 
BVE_GAAP 7.76 4.47 8.78 
NI_GAAP 0.28 0.03 0.85 
BVE_Diff -0.37 -0.07 0.79 
NI_Diff 0.06 0.01 0.45 
Closeout_IAS37 -0.09 -0.01 0.19 
NI_IAS37_Diff <0.01 <0.01 0.01 
    
Panel B - Results of equation (2) 
 
Expected sign Coefficient t-stat 
BVE_GAAP + 1.40*** 8.14 
NI_GAAP + 4.44*** 3.17 
BVE_Diff + 1.33 0.82 
NI_Diff + 1.41 0.56 
Closeout_IAS37 + 1.39 0.23 
NI_IAS37_Diff + -67.95 -0.63 
Oil and Gas ? 2.05 0.98 
    
Observations  87  
Adj. R-squared  0.72  
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: 
Panel B presents the price regression results based on equation (2).  
Variable Definitions: 
PRICE is closing share price at the end of quarter 1 for the first IFRS reporting year. 
BVE_GAAP is shareholder equity based on domestic GAAP. 
NI_GAAP is net income based on domestic GAAP. 
BVE_Diff is the change in shareholders’ equity based on the move to IFRS; less NI_Diff_IAS37 and 
Closeout_IAS37  
NI_Diff is the change in net income based on the move to IFRS, less NI_Diff_IAS37. 
Closeout_IAS37 is the closeout to retained earnings at transition date due to IAS 37. 
NI_IAS37_Diff is the change in accretion expense plus the change in depletion expense due to IAS 37.  
Oil and Gas is as described in Table 3. 
All continuous variables (except PRICE) are scaled by shares outstanding at the close of the first quarter 




Panel A – Sample descriptive statistics for equation (3) 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. 
 PRICE 12.11 6.07 13.98 
BVE 8.17 5.30 8.73 
NI 0.23 0.09 1.17 
EP 0.80 0.25 1.05 
    
Panel B - Results of equation (3) 
 
Expected sign Coefficient t-stat 
BVE + 0.94*** 11.08 
NI + 2.69*** 4.97 
EP - 1.26 1.57 
Own Credit Risk ? 0.67 0.45 
EP*Own Credit Risk - 0.42 0.40 
Oil and Gas ? 3.96*** 3.32 
Constant ? 0.800 0.70 
  (0.699)  
 
   
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  
Observations  220  
Adj. R-squared  0.72  
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: 
Panel B presents the price regression results based equation (3). 
Variable definitions: 
PRICE is closing share price at the end of quarter 1 for each of the first three IFRS reporting 
years. 
BVE is book value of equity at year-end plus environmental provisions, for the first three 
IFRS reporting years. 
NI is net income. 
EP is year-end environmental provisions. 
Own Credit Risk is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm includes own credit risk in the 
discount rate for environmental provision. 
Oil and Gas is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is in the oil and gas sector, 0 if it is 
in the mining sector.  
All continuous variables (except PRICE) are scaled by shares outstanding at the close of the 
first quarter of the first IFRS reporting year and winsorized at 2.5 percent. 
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TABLE 8. Discount rate used by a sample of non-Canadian IFRS firms 
 
# of firms 
Do not include 




own credit risk 
Oil and Gas 21 14 7 33% 
Mining 20 20 0 0% 
Other 20 18 2 10% 
Total 61 52 9 15% 
 
Notes: 
The ‘Other’ category includes firms from the chemical, pulp and paper and electric utilities 
industries. 
 
 
 
